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NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE TEETH OF HUMAN
FRAILTY: LESSONS FROM FINANCIAL REGULATION
CRISTIE FORD*
New governance scholarship has made important theoretical and
practical contributions to a broad range of regulatory arenas, including
securities and financial markets regulation. In the wake of the global financial
crisis, questions about the scope of possibilities for this scholarship are more
pressing than ever. Is new governance a full-blown alternative to existing
legal structures, or is it a useful complement? Are there essential
preconditions to making it work, or can a new governance strategy improve
any decision making structure? If there are essential preconditions, what are
they? Is new governance ―modular‖—that is, does it still confer benefits
when applied partially or imperfectly—or does it fail to achieve good
regulatory results unless all the elements are in place? This Article starts from
the conviction that new governance is a promising response to the fluidity
and complexity of contemporary regulatory environments. It then draws on
three essentially unhappy narratives from recent financial markets regulation
(around securities law enforcement, capital adequacy, and the impact of
securitization) in an attempt to identify lessons for new governance
scholarship at the level of practical implementation. These are not narratives
about the failure of new governance structures. However, central to each
narrative are components, or incomplete versions of components, that are
also central to new governance structures. The Article considers the
significance of incrementalism, regulatory capacity, and destabilization and
complexity for regulatory design. It closes with some preliminary
recommendations for making new governance structures effective, even as
implemented by flawed human actors.
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INTRODUCTION
New governance scholarship has made important contributions in a
broad range of regulatory arenas, ranging from environmental regulation
to workplace discrimination, international employment standards, and
beyond.
As the field has developed, some scholars have also turned their
minds to the scope of possibilities for new governance. Is it a full-blown
alternative to existing legal structures, or is it a useful complement? Are
there essential preconditions to making it work, or can a new governance
strategy improve any decision making structure? If there are essential
preconditions, what are they? When it works, why does it work? Is new
governance ―modular‖1—that is, does it still confer benefits when
applied partially or imperfectly—or does it fail to achieve good
regulatory results unless all the elements are in place?
For students of financial market regulation, the global financial
crisis of 2007–09 (GFC)2 has been a sobering illustration of human greed
and short-sightedness, and regulatory failure. This Article is a
preliminary attempt to identify lessons from recent financial markets
regulation and their bearing on new governance scholarship. Part I sets
out the continuing importance of new governance scholarship for
regulation. Part II presents three narratives, from different aspects of
financial regulation. In this Part, the Article proceeds from the most
discrete example to the most far-reaching and challenging, but each one
bears on the nature of the relationship between new governance
1.
With apologies to Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber, this variety of
modularity is not the same as their positive account of modular environmental regulation
in which regulatory components can be assembled and reassembled in different
arrangements depending on circumstance. See generally Jody Freeman & Daniel A.
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005).
2.
The GFC is broadly global in scope. Focusing only on the United States, it
can be dated from the first effects of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in
2006–07, through the collapse of global credit markets in fall 2008, which saw the failure
of major investment banks in the United States and brought about an industry bailout and
economic stimulus package of unprecedented size, and into the present day. For a
timeline of the core of the crisis, from September 2008 to September 2009, see A Year of
Financial Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2009/09/11/business/economy/20090911_FINANCIALCRISIS_TIMELI
NE.html?ref=businessspecial4.
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regulatory design and the much less satisfactory regulation-asimplemented. These are not narratives about the failure of new
governance structures. Financial regulation was not new governance
regulation. Moreover, the main regulatory failures implicated in the GFC
were the products of gaps in regulation, extraordinarily inadequate
execution, and a regulatory mindset excessively well-disposed toward
self-regulation. That said, central to each narrative are components (or
incomplete versions of components) that are also central to new
governance structures.
More precisely, these are stories about how regulatory oversight
mechanisms that were designed to be both robust and flexible proved in
practice to lose their robustness and to have their flexibility invoked
primarily in the interests of powerful industry actors. For example, the
first narrative describes how certain corporate compliance monitorships
have been only anemically implemented, highlighting the importance of
cognitive distance, capacity, and impartiality on the part of the real-life
human decision-makers central to those structures. The second narrative
argues that principles-based regulation around capital adequacy (such as
provided for under the Consolidated Supervised Entities program at the
SEC, and the Basel II regime on which it was based), when built on
inadequately scrutinized internal firm risk assessment models, enabled a
behavioral cascade and permitted flawed methodologies to increase
systemic risk. The third narrative focuses on complexity in structured
products. It tries to illuminate some of the ways in which the use of
derivatives and securitization technology have amplified power, allowed
power to be exercised covertly within corporate structures, and permitted
financial institutions to circumvent or neutralize regulatory oversight.
Part III of this Article sets out to identify the lessons that emerge for
new governance scholarship at the level of practical implementation.
This Article explains these implementation failures substantially as a
product of power imbalances, bounded rationality, and the human
tendency to ―satisfice.‖3 Different scholars may reach different
conclusions as to how often problems like these will actually sabotage
new governance regulatory design. But if they are unavoidable
background conditions, and influential enough to affect practical
outcomes in a significant number of cases, then—in keeping with a
method that reflects learning back into regulatory design—new
governance scholars should be turning their attention to designing
compensatory structures to address these foreseeable problems.

3.
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 204–05
(1957) (explaining that ―satisficing‖ means settling for an adequate, but not optimal
solution).
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The Article closes with a call for more serious attention to the
―architecture‖ of new governance, and in particular to the need to build
in practically effective counterweights to the predictable pitfalls that can
undermine the potential of new governance theory. It argues that one
should not underestimate the considerable determination and focus
required to make new governance structures reliably robust across
different regulatory concerns. In particular, it argues for a renewed
appreciation of the amount of energy required to move people off their
short-term incentives—an amount substantially greater than was put into
the monitorship or principles-based regulatory initiatives described
below, and that may even be greater than is politically palatable in some
number of contexts. Second, the Article points out that reason-giving and
problem-solving techniques collapse when key players‘ interests are
aligned, as they tend to be during a market bubble, or in contexts already
characterized by a readiness to accept merely ―cosmetic compliance.‖4
This points to the need to build in diversity and internal contestation in a
much more serious way than generally has been done. Third, the Article
suggests that Knightian uncertainty5 is not necessarily, or not only, a new
governance-enhancing background condition. It can present profound
problems to which new governance may not be a necessary and
sufficient response—or even, at least over the short term, the wisest
response.
I. CRUCIAL COMPONENTS OF NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-GFC
ENVIRONMENT
The term ―new governance‖ is something of a big tent that captures
several discrete but related approaches.6 Within new governance, we
might identify as a tighter subset the ―experimentalist‖ approach
principally generated by Charles Sabel and his colleagues, including
Michael Dorf and Bill Simon.7 Susan Sturm‘s important work on

4.
Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
5.
See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
6.
See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004).
7.
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); James S. Liebman &
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of
School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2004);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
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institutional change and public-law remedies is another new governance
approach.8 New governance also likely incorporates, or at least bears a
strong relationship to, versions of reflexive law,9 responsive regulation or
enforced self-regulation,10 co-regulation,11 and management-based
regulation.12
For purposes of this Article, the essential components of a new
governance approach are regulation that is informed and underpinned by
a bottom-up, decentered, horizontal experimental process by private
actors—which, on our facts, depending on context, could include
registrants like investment banks and broker-dealers, professional
―gatekeepers‖13 such as accountants and lawyers, and public companies.
My own focus is on new governance in the context of regulation, that is,
on designs that assume a systemic ordering role for a public bureaucratic
structure, rather than relying primarily on private interparty arrangements
or courts. New governance regulation, unlike command-and-control
regulation, is regulation based on an iterative process between privateparty experience and a regulator that serves variously as clearinghouse,
catalyst, monitor, prod, and coordinator.
The new governance regulator prioritizes mechanisms that share
information from localized experiments and that push localities to
improve by comparison to the experience of others, rather than trying to
regulate via detailed, process-based, top-down regulatory requirements.
The process is pragmatic, information- and experience-based, directed
toward ongoing problem-solving, and built around highly participatory
and carefully structured dialogue. As a matter of institutional design, it
relies on information-based and information-forcing techniques:

8.
Sturm‘s work informs and is informed by the experimentalist approach, but
see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 555 n.353 (2001).
9.
See Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227
(1995); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW &
SOC‘Y REV. 239 (1983). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 471 (2004).
10.
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992);
John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime
Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1981).
11.
See Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in
European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1 (2005), available
at http://www.ejcl.org/91/abs91-3.html.
12.
See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 691
(2003).
13.
JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006).
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specifically, reason-giving, transparent processes, benchmarking and
outcome analysis, and shared information. It is incrementalist in that it
uses discrete, situational learning to cause regulation to evolve in
empirically justified ways. It is ambitious in that it folds those discrete
experiences, operating in parallel, into a flexible, ―best practices‖-driven
process14 that has the potential to fundamentally reshape both means and
ends.
Above all, for purposes of this Article, three related convictions that
underlie new governance regulatory strategies are indispensable to
modern regulation, because they are designed to handle the complexity,
speed, and interconnection that characterize both contemporary society
and contemporary capital markets. The first is the emphasis on ―learning
by doing.‖ Empirical experience, the ―doing,‖ is the foundation of new
governance regulation. In itself that is a step that is likely to lead to
greater pragmatic effectiveness than an ideologically driven
methodology.15 The doing is then the driver for a structured learning
process that pulls that experience into a self-reflexive process, rather than
letting it dissipate across time and multiple actors.
The second component is revisability, or the explicit recognition of
contingency. Flexibility is a key characteristic of new governance
methods. Learning by doing is the method, but it needs to be
accompanied by actual mechanisms that make it possible for regulation
to move. Examples might include principles-based regulation, supported
by a regulator-based notice-and-comment rulemaking method that can
permit speedy decisions by informed actors; or broad-based
destabilization rights available under particular conditions.16
The third, linked component is a degree of humility about
knowability. At an initial level, new governance recognizes that
regulators cannot know as much about the practical operations of the
industries they oversee as those within those industries themselves. This
is what drives the bottom-up process in the first place. At a deeper level,
along with civic republicans, new governance scholars like Michael Dorf
and Charles Sabel recognize the socially constructed, profoundly
contingent, and path dependent nature of legal artifacts generally, such as

14.
Whether regulators ought to rely on ―best practices‖ or ―good practices‖ is a
matter of debate among securities regulators. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance,
Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 43 n.144
(2008) [hereinafter Ford, New Governance, Compliance ].
15.
On Deweyan pragmatism and experimentalism, see, e.g., Brandon L.
Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL‘Y
REV. 261 (2004).
16.
See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 7.
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rights.17 Still more profoundly, a relationship exists between new
governance and epistemological uncertainty. It is a relationship marked
by paradox,18 but it is not without promise. New governance authors
have argued that conditions of extreme uncertainty, in which participants
cannot identify either the means they want to use or the ends they are
trying to achieve, are environments where new governance is more likely
to emerge, and to be useful in breaking through impasses. Radical
uncertainty resulting from extreme complexity has been a central feature
of capital markets regulation, and was closely implicated in the GFC.
The problem is a wicked one, without easy solutions. Nevertheless, new
governance revisability based on closely monitored practical experience
and broad stakeholder participation may be one of the few potentially
promising ways that we might try to deal with it.
With these tools in hand we can proceed to the narratives, which
ultimately both reinforce and complicate the insights that new
governance offers. Recent events in financial markets regulation have
profoundly shaken our collective confidence in existing regulatory
approaches. They have also undermined our collective faith in our own
capacity to understand events as they transpire, to anticipate future
developments, and to design systems that can be robust in complex
environments. All of this should recommend more incremental,
pragmatic, learning-by-doing regulatory design strategies. At the same
time, these same narratives describe incremental, apparently pragmatic
regulatory moves that, though believed by many to be sensible at the
time, collectively operated to the great detriment of many. They suggest
that incrementalism as it operated here—within built regulatory
environments that share important features with new governance
regulatory environments—cannot on its own be relied upon to advance
collective welfare—in the sense of increasing transparency, reducing
systemic risk, protecting investors and members of the public, supporting
real economy productivity, and maintaining an adequate level of social
stability and interpersonal accountability. The challenge, then, is to
imagine an alternative within which regulatory design is not always a
drag on human capacity and imagination, in the way that old style nonreflexive command-and-control regulation can be, and yet that puts
sufficient brakes on risk-blind hubris, socially detrimental selfaggrandizement, and predictable human flaws in decision-making and
information processing.

17.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 446–52 (arguing that experimentalist
rights are ―the only kind of rights that we actually have‖).
18.
See discussion infra Part II.C (―Clever People: Destabilization, Complexity,
and Power in Securitization Practice‖).
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II. THREE NARRATIVES FROM FINANCIAL AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Each of the narratives below comes from securities and financial
markets regulation, although from distinct contexts within that field. The
first narrative concerns monitorships being employed in securities law
enforcement. It identifies the ways in which new governance-style
enforcement mechanisms can be undermined by failure to build in
meaningful accountability. The second narrative considers principlesbased regulatory structures, particularly the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission‘s Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE)
program, which allowed parent entities of ―shadow banks‖ to use internal
risk modeling to assess the risks associated with their business, and
thereby to set their own capital reserve levels. Devolving this
responsibility, which took place within a highly complex, highly
competitive, fast-moving and yet non-transparent and poorly overseen
environment, turned out to be disastrous. Again, the story is primarily
about regulatory failure to build accountability and enforceability into a
self-regulatory model. The third narrative looks at the influence of
securitization itself, in particular with regard to how it affects regulators‘
capacity to regulate the financial services industry. Derivatives and
structured finance products have been core tools for speculation and
hedging for many years now. Their recent massive proliferation does,
however, have implications for corporate law and securities regulation in
terms of transparency and accountability.
The leitmotif that runs through all three accounts concerns the ways
in which background conditions that are either subtle or taken for
granted—including lack of diversity, power imbalances, unequal access
to information, and failures of transparency and accountability—have the
potential to make reasonably designed regulatory initiatives ineffective,
or worse. These are stories in which well-resourced actors were able to
control loosely structured, fluid environments in their own interest, with
minimal pushback from public-interested voices. In other words, they are
situations in which our flawed humanity (tribal, short-sighted, selfinterested but often irrational, and prone to satisficing) infiltrated
regulatory models, reintroduced power relationships in indistinct but
convincing ways, and arguably determined outcomes to a greater degree
than did regulatory design. The section titles below offer shorthand
labels for the relevant characteristics of the individuals involved, with the
intention of keeping the human element in the foreground of each
narrative.
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A. Reliable People: Corporate Monitorships in Theory and Practice
Securities law enforcement has recently been making use of a
particular set of innovations: the non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreement in the criminal realm, and its civil regulatory equivalent, the
reform undertaking. These are settlement agreements under which, in
exchange for leniency or a deferral or prosecution for alleged violations
of the securities laws, a corporation or firm agrees to end its wrongful
practices, develop and implement an improved compliance program,
and—most importantly for purposes of this Article—hire an independent
monitor to oversee those undertakings and make reform
recommendations.19 Monitorships have been imposed on some very wellknown firms and corporations, including America Online, KPMG,
Boeing, Monsanto, and AIG (this last for reasons unrelated to credit
default swaps or executive bonuses).20 They are not unlike consent
decrees in civil-rights-based structural reform litigation.21 Being systemic
remedies, they seem well suited to responding to systemic problems.
They could be used to push corporations to implement effective
compliance and ethics programs and improve the ethics aspects of their
organizational cultures—meaning, the informal control system within the
organization. What is less clear is whether, as implemented, they stand a
decent chance of doing so.
At a theoretical level, monitorships can be understood as a nascent
new governance form developing within the securities law enforcement
milieu.22 Seen in these terms, the ideal monitorship structure requires a

19.
See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L.
REV. 853, 855–56 (2007); Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a
Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863 (2005); Jennifer O‘Hare, The Use of the
Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89
(2006); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006).
20.
Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680 (2009). On AIG, see Peter Lattman, The
US’s Fly on the Wall at AIG, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at C1 (noting that a monitor
was in place at AIG before and during the financial crisis, but was not charged with
investigating matters directly related to the financial crisis, such as the use of credit
default swaps).
21.
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 19, at 869–74.
22.
See generally Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (2005) [hereinafter Ford, Toward a New Model ]
(discussing the civil ―reform undertaking‖ process at the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission). Miriam Baer has since challenged this view at a descriptive
level, arguing that whatever else they may be, reform undertakings and deferred
prosecution agreements are not and can never be an example of new governance. See
generally Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009).
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broadly participatory, dialogic, and transparent problem-solving process
capable of learning from its own mistakes. The idea here is that
monitorships can create a space for meaningful dialogue because,
although they are embedded within the enforcement context, they are
sufficiently set apart by virtue of being post-settlement and managed by
an independent third party monitor. Relative to one-off sanctions such as
fines, such a forward-looking and participatory method could be more
effective in catalyzing cultural reform.23 It uses the organization‘s own
language and norms to foster endogenous learning. This increases the
likelihood of buy-in, which is especially essential when dealing with
ethical cultural problems.24 Moreover, such a monitorship can potentially
identify more useful recommendations, because it relies on more sources
of information, consulted in a less high-pressure environment.25 This can
make scapegoating and cosmetic compliance26 harder to get away with.
Clearly, catalyzing a new governance deliberative process by way of
a monitorship requires careful design choices. For one thing, the monitor
would have to possess an impressive range of attributes. It (or he or she)
would have to have credibility with both regulator and corporation, while
still maintaining structural and psychological independence from the
corporation in particular—even while working closely with its
management and employees. It would need to possess considerable
strategic planning, problem solving, facilitating, and information
management capabilities. It should be able to generate useful and,
ideally, generalizable data. The monitor would also require substantive
experience including knowledge about best practices in compliance and
corporate governance, as well as a grasp of legal concepts such as
fairness and due process sufficient to allow it to identify and respond to
scapegoating and other, often subtle, justice-related challenges.27 The
framing enforcement environment around the monitorship, and in
particular the background threat of renewed enforcement action in the
event of shirking or failure, would also be crucial to forcing change
within recalcitrant organizations. Additionally, regulators would need the
ability to centrally aggregate and work with data coming from discrete
monitorships—in new governance terms, they would require a
―clearinghouse‖ function—in order to make risk assessment,
comparative analysis, and outcome evaluation possible.28

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ford, Toward a New Model, supra note 22, at 802–10.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 802.
Krawiec, supra note 4.
Ford, Toward a New Model, supra note 22, at 810–14.
Id. at 814–17.
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In 2008, Professor David Hess and I conducted an empirical study
to investigate how corporate monitorships were functioning in practice.29
We found, perhaps not surprisingly, that actually existing monitorships
tend to fall short of the idealized new governance monitorship in one or
more ways. In our project, we separated the monitorship process into five
stages: the decision to settle and establish a monitorship, setting the
scope of the monitorship, selecting the monitor, conducting the
monitorship, and post-monitorship learning.30 What we found was that
the potential for a breakdown in effective implementation exists at each
stage of the monitorship. Moreover, problems at early stages put the
monitorship on a downward trajectory, in terms of ambition, that make
its prospects for achieving meaningful reform increasingly remote with
every subsequent stage.31 Without saying that successful monitorships
have never occurred, our analysis suggests that positive results have
more to do with self-motivated individual efforts of monitors and
corporations, than with a model that reliably produces good process and
meaningful reform.32
For example, one of the first decisions a regulator faces is how to
proceed against the corporation and individuals in it: whether to indict or
charge the corporation, whether to agree to a settlement (with or without
a monitor), or alternatively whether to prosecute individuals only.33
Where corporations have the sense that this choice is primarily motivated
by external considerations, such as perceived need to be seen to be taking
action against a corporation, the legitimacy of the process is undermined
from the start.34 Developing the scope of the monitorship can also be
problematic. In many cases, monitorship agreements seem to develop
mimetically35 rather than in response to careful attention to a unique
context. The starting point often seems to be some other, generic
monitorship agreement, whose terms are then modified based in large
part on the negotiating position of the corporation.36 Sometimes, we had

29.
Our study and its findings are described in Ford & Hess, supra note 20. The
discussion of monitorships contained here draws on that work.
30.
Id. at 695–96.
31.
Id. at 730.
32.
Id. at 728.
33.
Id. at 697.
34.
See id. at 728–29.
35.
See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
SOC. REV. 147, 151–52 (1983) (describing mimetic isomorphism as a process through
which organizations copy each other to draw on the legitimacy established by the prior
example, and not due to its fitness to the new environment).
36.
Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 816–20 (2008) (describing the settlement
negotiating process). Barnard shares many of our concerns regarding the effectiveness of
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the impression that only cursory attention had been paid, at this stage, to
ensuring that the resulting monitorship was appropriately tailored to the
particular mix of potential systemic, process-based, and cultural
problems at a particular corporation.
Early stage flaws in scope definition would not be terribly
worrisome if monitorship agreements could be renegotiated on a rolling
basis, but the high costs of monitorships, the fear of ―scope creep,‖ and
monitorships‘ entrenchment in formal legal settlement documents makes
this very unlikely. More often, the response is to build some vagueness
into the exact terms of the monitorship—which is something different
from building in carefully designed flexibility provisions. When
vagueness is introduced, the course of the monitorship depends less on
the agreement itself, and more on the monitor‘s interpretation of it based
on the monitor‘s own background and predilections. And it is at the point
of selecting the monitor that the reformative potential of the monitorship
seems most fundamentally to be undermined.
Monitors may be appointed by the government, or selected based on
varying degrees of input from the corporation. Regardless of the process
used, with striking frequency the end result is the selection of a former
prosecutor or other government employee, with legal training but little to
no experience as a monitor, and no formal training in compliance or
management. The reason for the significant use of former prosecutors
seems to be perceived credibility.37 The government wants someone it
can identify with and believes it can trust, and the corporation wants to
ensure that its monitor has credibility with the government.38 The
significant potential problem, at least according to compliance
consultants we interviewed, is that these monitors are unlikely to have
the experience and knowledge necessary to analyze a corporation‘s
culture or provide advice on how to manage that culture as it relates to
the corporation‘s compliance program.39 For example, such monitors are
more likely to believe that the root causes of wrongdoing within the

monitorships, the monitor selection process, and the capacity of lawyers in general and
SEC (or, for us, criminal and civil) Enforcement staffers in particular to craft
monitorships with the potential to achieve meaningful structural change. Id. at 837–38.
Barnard also agrees that the SEC should be managing the data coming from monitorships
more effectively, and making better use of monitors‘ final reports. Id. at 837–39. Her
views differ from ours in other respects, including her confidence in mainstream
corporate law mechanisms (e.g., the presence of independent directors) to discipline
firms. Id. at 837–38. She concludes that monitorships and other ―therapeutics‖ should be
used sparingly because their usefulness has not been demonstrated. Id. at 838.
37.
Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 713.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 714.
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organization are employee ignorance of laws and corporate policies, as
opposed to management pressure to meet performance expectations.40
We also found wide variation in how monitors conduct their work.41
Some monitors felt that they had no choice but to consider issues of
corporate culture based on what the settlement agreement tasked them
with accomplishing.42 Others, appointed under virtually identical
settlement agreement language, told us that they focused on the technical
aspects of compliance and controls, and that issues of culture could not
be measured, had no real meaning, or were beyond their assigned
duties.43 Even those monitors that claimed to be considering corporate
culture took significantly different approaches to assessing it.44 Some
interviewed employees at all levels of the corporation and sat in on
meetings where important decisions were being made, while others
interviewed only those at the top of the organization.45 The monitors we
interviewed did not generally engage in the broad-based interviews and
focus groups that compliance consultants and business ethics
professionals would recommend, let alone the kind of reflexive process
imagined by new governance scholarship.
Finally, we identified a clear lack of architecture designed to permit
systematic post-monitorship learning and analysis.46 Especially with
regard to criminal monitorships, notwithstanding that they are rich
sources of information and insight, we found little evidence that
monitorships were treated with anything near the attention that presettlement cases received.47 Little effort seemed to be made, on
conclusion of a monitorship, to evaluate its successes and failures or to
fold its insights into subsequent monitorships.48 Monitors also lack
systematic opportunities to learn from each other. Their reports are kept
confidential, and monitors do not share information with each other.49
40.
GARY E. EDWARDS & ROBERT REID, CHALLENGES FACING CORPORATE
ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: A RESEARCH REPORT FROM ETHOS INTERNATIONAL
10–11
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ethosinternational.net/files/689
_file_PDF_EthosResearchReport2007.pdf (reporting the results of a survey of legally
trained chief compliance officers versus those from a management background).
41.
See Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 715–19.
42.
Id. at 716.
43.
Id. at 716–17.
44.
Id. at 717–18.
45.
Id. at 718.
46.
See id. at 724–26, 736–37.
47.
Id. at 726. Civil-side regulators more commonly pass monitors‘ reports onto
their compliance or examinations departments, which may use the reports as blueprints
for subsequent compliance examinations and audits; prosecutors‘ offices lack the
institutional structure to do this. Id.
48.
Id. at 725.
49.
Id. at 736.

FORD - READ THROUGH.DOC

114

6/9/2010 12:27 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Although settlement agreement terms are replicated, the lessons of actual
practice are not being captured.50 What happens after a monitorship ends
was poignantly summarized by one of our interviewees:
Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn‘t, maybe nobody
knows, because there‘s nobody out there evaluating these
things. And unless a company gets caught doing something
improper again nobody may find out whether the deferred
prosecution agreement worked or didn‘t work.51
Some recommendations for improved monitorships spring easily to
mind. We would prefer the scope of monitorships to be determined in a
more outcome-oriented, flexible, yet context-specific fashion. Monitors
should be selected for a broader range of applicable skills. Former
prosecutors with no monitorship experience do not stand out as the only
good option here, despite their perceived credibility with other
prosecutors. A more participatory and dialogue-based approach is likely
to be more effective. The absence of mechanisms to systematize learning
at the prosecutor or regulator level is another major failing, and affects
those actors‘ abilities to provide effective oversight.
But the thornier problem is that in the final analysis, contemporary
monitorships seem disposed toward being ―closed shops.‖ The
participants share a fundamental unity of interest around keeping the
monitorship project and the corporation‘s rehabilitation moving ahead
smoothly. None of the parties involved—the corporation, the government
agency, or the monitor—have an incentive to drive the monitorship
beyond technical fixes and good optics to something more profound,
more uncertain, and more unpredictable (in the way that real, open-ended
dialogue and deep analysis can be).
Although there are exceptions, the following seems to be a common
story: the corporation naturally wants to retain as much freedom as
possible. It will push the government and the monitor to devise and
implement as limited a monitorship as possible. It is helped in its case by
the argument that unaccountable monitors should not be permitted to run
amok and interfere with a public company‘s internal operations at
infinitum and at shareholders‘ expense. For their part, monitors may not
provide significant push-back against the corporation‘s limited
interpretation of their mandate, because the monitor may naturally come
to view the corporation as their ―client,‖ due to the close working
relationship that develops over time, the corporation‘s role in selecting
that monitor in certain cases, or the monitor‘s background as a corporate
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 725.
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defense attorney in private practice (which is a common career move for
former prosecutors). Finally, especially on the criminal side, government
enforcers may be more focused on closing their file and moving on to the
next the case, rather than pushing the monitor to dig deeper into the
workings of the corporation. This is particularly so because it is
exceedingly difficult to assess, from outside, whether a firm has an
effective compliance program in place and whether a monitor has done
an adequate job of rooting out problems. Prosecutors hire monitors to do
this work precisely because they do not have the skills or bandwidth to
do it themselves, and therefore may not even know the right questions to
ask. The end result is the strong likelihood of low ambition monitorships
focused on technical compliance with policy and procedure
requirements.
B. Self-Interested People: Principles-Based Regulation and Basel II
Principles-based regulation has been a feature of regulatory
innovation in securities law in recent years, most notably the United
Kingdom, but also in Canada. Principles-based and analogous
approaches are also used at transnational and intersystemic levels, as a
way of moving toward policy-level or outcome-level coordination or
convergence, even though the necessary step of reconciling separate
legal regimes has not taken place.52 The June 2004 Basel II Capital
52.
The familiar example here is the European Union‘s Open Method of
Coordination, a functional and ongoing process that has attracted positive attention from
new governance scholars. See, e.g., GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA & JONATHAN ZEITLIN, CENTRE
FOR EUROPEAN POL‘Y STUDS., CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 31, CONSTITUTIONALISING THE
OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION: WHAT SHOULD THE CONVENTION PROPOSE? (2003),
available at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1010.pdf. The seeds of the FSA‘s
principles-based approach were also sewn in response to the need to amalgamate regimes
across preexisting regulatory entities. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 8,
DESIGNING THE FSA HANDBOOK OF RULES AND GUIDANCE 4–6 (1998), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/CP08.pdf. In the interest of maintaining continuity and a
―good standard of regulation during the transitional period,‖ the FSA was launched in
1997, but did not have its own statutory source of regulatory power until December 2001.
See Financial Services and Markets Act [FSMA], 2000, cl. 8, §§ 2(2)–(3) (Eng.); Howard
Davies, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at the FSA Launch Conference (Oct. 28,
1997),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/
Communication/Speeches/1997/SP02.shtml. The FSMA replaced much of the previous
legislation, including the Financial Services Act of 1986, the Banking Act of 1987, and
the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 under which banks, insurance companies and other
financial services firms had been authorized and supervised. In its early days the FSA did
not see itself as a principles-based regulator, so much as a risk-based, outcome-oriented,
cost-effective, consultative, and management-based one. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
ANNUAL
REPORTS
11
(2002–03),
available
at
http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/ar02?03.pdf; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY: AN OUTLINE 31–33 (1997), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
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Accords53 are an essentially principles-based transnational agreement,
this time governing supervision of banks. I have argued elsewhere that
principles-based regulation in securities law should be seen as a new
governance approach to regulation,54 and propose to use that lens here in
describing the troubles that devolution, when not accompanied by
adequate regulatory oversight, can pose for new governance scholarship.
In the context of statutory drafting, more principles-based (as
opposed to rules-based) regulation means legislation that contains more
directives that are cast at a higher level of generality. But statutory
drafting is only a small, formal, and ultimately inessential component of
principles-based regulation.55 The essential components of a principles-

policy/launch.pdf. The principles-based turn came later. The frequency of use of the term
―more principles-based‖ had increased by orders of magnitude by late 2006 or early
2007. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA Business Plan Focuses on More
Principles-Based
Regulation
(Feb.
6,
2007),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/
Library/Communication/PR/2007/019.shtml.
53.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A
REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/B.C.bs107.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 BASEL II ACCORDS].
54.
Ford, New Governance, Compliance, supra note 14, at 5–6. The term
―principles-based regulation‖ is the dominant one in securities regulation, likely for pathdependent reasons stemming from post-Enron worries about whether U.S. GAAP rules
were too rules-based. However, some scholars would argue that new governance methods
transcend the rules-versus-principles debate. See Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform,
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 536–37, 554–56 (2009) (arguing that new governance, or
―experimentalist,‖ practice resolves ―the rules/standard antimony‖ debate through a
―simultaneous emphasis on articulation and flexibility‖). These scholars argue, by
contrast, that an experimentalist regime actually transcends the rules-versus-principles
debate. Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, the fully articulated version of
what I call principles-based regulation is not actually in tension with what Noonan et al.
would describe. They find it most useful to frame the phenomenon as a pragmatic,
practical method that bypasses an unproductive theoretical conversation. I find it most
useful to describe essentially the same phenomenon by focusing on principles-based
regulation as a first-order decision that reflects an appreciation of the relative capacities
of legislative drafters, regulators, and industry actors. Nevertheless, my version of
principles-based regulation calls for careful attention to implementation mechanisms that
pull detailed industry knowledge into the articulation of those principles, in a way that is
strongly similar to what Noonan et al. describe.
55.
I am not alone in describing principles-based regulation as requiring more
than principles-based drafting. See also Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of PrinciplesBased Regulation 12 (Law, Soc‘y & Econ. Working Papers, 13/2008, 2008), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14726527/Forms-and-Paradoxes-of-Principles-BasedRegulation-by-Julia-Black [hereinafter Black, Forms and Paradoxes ] (distinguishing
―formal PBR,‖ meaning principles in the rule books; ―substantive PBR,‖ which has some
of the operational elements of PBR but not principles on the rule books; ―full PBR,‖
exhibiting both principles in the rule books and a principles-based operational approach;
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based approach are to be found at the level of implementation, in terms
of the techniques that are developed to translate those principles into
specific business conduct expectations in context-sensitive, flexible,
dialogue-based ways.
Structurally, the most profound differences between more
principles-based and more rules-based approaches to securities
regulation are in two areas: the proportion of decision making and
interpretive power that is explicitly left to be filled in through the
rulemaking function, rather than statutory drafting; and the proportion of
outcome-oriented versus process-oriented statutory requirements.
Principles-based regulation moves substantial authority over detailed
requirements from legislator to regulator, to be addressed through its
rule-making power. It also tends to be structured in a more outcomeoriented, as opposed to process-oriented, manner, meaning that the
regulator in turn devolves decision making over detailed process to the
industry actors it regulates.56 Outcome-oriented regulation measures
performance against regulatory goals, whereas process-based regulation
measures compliance with detailed procedural requirements.57
As a regulatory strategy, outcome orientation has a clear new
governance cast to it. It also has important implications for the approach
to regulation. By definition, outcome-oriented regulation recognizes that
there may be more than one means (i.e., more than one process) through
which to achieve a regulatory goal. It transfers decision making about
detailed process from regulators to industry. For its proponents,
outcome-oriented regulation establishes a more direct relationship
between regulatory goals and regulatory requirements, thereby making
more efficient use of regulatory and industry resources. By contrast,
process-oriented requirements that are developed by regulators in
advance, in disregard of the fact that regulators possess less contextual
information than industry actors, may not be perfectly tailored to
regulatory goals. Process-oriented regulation can also permit market
participants to abide by the letter of the law while ignoring its spirit. This

and ―polycentric PBR,‖ which is full PBR with the additional element of incorporating
third parties into the regulatory process).
56.
See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON
THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 4, 6–7, 9, 12 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf.
57.
In actual practice, there is no necessary disconnect between outcomeoriented regulation and a third approach that some scholars call management-based
regulation. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 692, 694. There are differences
between the two concepts in terms of at what stage of firm conduct the regulator
intervenes, but both place responsibility for detailed decision-making with industry
actors, and give those actors the flexibility to design mechanisms that work for them
based on their greater knowledge about their own businesses.
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is especially the case when it comes to highly complex instruments, or
areas where events are fast-moving and regulators on their own (let alone
legislatures!) could not hope to keep up with the pace of innovation.
Fundamental to a principles-based system is the existence or
development of an ―interpretive community‖58 that collectively develops,
on a rolling basis, the detailed content of statutory principles. In order to
function transparently and predictably, a principles-based system must
build in mechanisms that allow regulators to communicate with industry
about their expectations, and that both allow and require industry to
speak openly and regularly with regulators about their processes.
Communication can take place through a number of channels including
official administrative guidance, speeches, ―no action‖ letters,
compliance audits, the incorporation and dissemination of good or best
practices, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement
actions.59 Over time, such communication can help develop an
interpretive community that understands regulatory expectations, and can
usefully interpret regulatory pronouncements about ―reasonableness‖ or
―effectiveness‖ in different situations.60
What principles-based securities regulation means, then, is a
particular way of structuring regulation, not a decision to do away with
rules. Principles-based regulation is based on the conviction that while
legislators and statutory drafters have the public legitimacy to establish
broad regulatory goals, they are not in the best position to develop
detailed guidelines for industry conduct, especially in fast-moving arenas
like securities regulation. Those powers are allocated to frontline
regulators at the relevant securities commission, whose expertise derives
from their proximity to industry and whose accountability derives from
the notice-and-comment aspect of their rulemaking powers. Moreover,
and crucially, even those frontline regulators are limited in their access to
information by comparison to the industries they regulate. These are the
parties thought to be in the best position to both assess and bear their
58.
JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 30–37 (1997); STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 354–57
(1980); Julia Black, Talking About Regulation, PUB. L. 77, 77 (1998); Sol Picciotto,
Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State, 29 LAW &
POL‘Y 11 (2007).
59.
On best practices and critical success factors in principles-based regulation
see, e.g., Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-Based Regulation, 1 LAW &
FIN. MKTS. REV. 191 (2007).
60.
Don Langevoort makes the thought-provoking argument that this kind of
collaborative regulation is more likely to be successful in small and socially
interconnected sectors. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009). Retail-heavy
markets like the American one may have to rely more heavily on ex-post enforcement,
despite its disadvantages. Id.
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own risks. In order to stay relevant and informed about fast-moving
industry practice, to keep regulation sufficiently flexible, and to avoid
inhibiting productive innovation, regulators need to establish open and
perpetual communication lines with industry. They need to use industry‘s
own good and best practices to add the ―meat‖ of detail to the ―bones‖ of
their principles-based regulatory expectations.
International banking regulation, in the form of the Basel II Capital
Accord,61 shares similar assumptions. It establishes high-level, outcomeoriented requirements around the amount of capital that financial
institutions need to maintain in reserve, and then devolves the processbased risk assessment details to the institutions themselves.62 The greater
risk a financial institution was carrying, the greater its reserves had to
be.63 Basel II capital adequacy formulae, in turn, were incorporated in
2004 into the United States Securities and Exchange Commission‘s
alternative net capital requirements for leading broker-dealers, under the
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Program.64 The CSE Program,
which was voluntary,65 gave the leading ―shadow banks‖ operating in the
United States the same leeway that international banks had to assess their
own capital reserve levels.

61.
See 2004 BASEL II ACCORDS, supra note 53.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830, 69 Fed. Reg.
34,428 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.pdf. The
text of the rule acknowledges that a ―broker-dealer‘s deductions for market and credit
risk probably will be lower under the alternative method of computing net capital than
under the standard net capital rule.‖ Id. To be eligible to use the alternative method of
computing net capital, the broker-dealer had to maintain tentative net capital (meaning
net capital before deducting securities haircuts and charges on inventory) of at least $1
billion and net capital of at least $500 million. Id. It also had to have in place
comprehensive internal risk management procedures that addressed market, credit,
liquidity, legal, and operational risk at the firm, and to observe certain disclosure
requirements vis-à-vis the SEC. Id. The ultimate holding company of those brokerdealers—which were global financial institutions operating in the shadow banking
sector—also had to consent to certain disclosure and risk assessment protocols, to permit
the SEC to examine it and its affiliates, and monthly to compute capital requirements and
risk in accordance with Basel standards. Id. The Program was terminated in September
2008. Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised
Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2008/2008-230.htm.
65.
SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, REPORT NO. 446–A,
SEC‘S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 81 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf [hereinafter, CSE REPORT]. That the CSE Program was
voluntary was reportedly a function of the fact that no U.S. agency had regulatory
authority over certain investment bank holding companies. Id.
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The alternative net capital requirements established under Basel II
and the CSE Program are technical rules whose details do not need to be
recited here. The point for current purposes is that the overall strategy of
establishing capital adequacy requirements based on internal firm risk
modeling failed dramatically. The nature of the modern structured
financial products is relevant. Assessing risks associated with standard
equity products is fairly straightforward. Regulators could likely assess
establish decent estimates of those risks on their own. Many modern
structured finance products, by contrast, are almost indescribably
complex, and assessing the risks associated with them calls for high math
and powerful modeling tools. Following (in the United States) the
passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, the overthe-counter market for derivatives, notably including subprime
mortgage-based consolidated debt obligations and their squares and
cubes, and credit default swaps, expanded massively.66 These structured
financial products tend to be relatively illiquid (because they are traded
over the counter, and not on exchanges which could enable more
efficient price discovery); proprietary and non-standardized (and so
difficult to compare); extraordinarily complex; and rapidly evolving.67
As Basel II and the CSE Program implicitly acknowledged, regulators—

66.
See Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O‘Brien, Financiers Plan to Put
Controls on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at C1 (discussing the move towards
self-regulation in derivative markets, prior to the GFC); Testimony Concerning Turmoil
in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities,
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions Before S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs (2008) (statement of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092308cc.htm (recognizing a
lack of regulatory oversight in the market for CDSs and other derivative products).
67.
They differ in their attributes, but most over-the counter (OTC) derivative
contracts are at least documented under standard forms, known as Masters, created by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. See International Swap and
Derivatives Association, Inc., http://www.isda.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). The
United States Department of the Treasury recently presented a bill to Congress that
would significantly augment private standardization initiatives. See Press Release, U.S.
Dep‘t of the Treasury, Administration‘s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New
Milestone: Final Piece of Legislation Language Delivered to Capitol Hill (Aug. 11,
2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg261.htm. The Treasury‘s bill would allow
bank regulators to establish margin and capital requirements for banks entering into
derivatives contracts; would require standardized OTC derivatives contracts to be cleared
by a derivatives clearing organization regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission or the SEC; and would require banks to have their standardized contracts
centrally cleared and traded over regulated exchanges. Id. Dealers, also, would no longer
be able to directly trade standardized derivatives contracts among themselves, but would
be required to use an exchange or equivalent trading platform. Id.
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let alone a disclosure-oriented regulator like the SEC68—could not hope
to adequately assess the risks associated with these products themselves.
Moreover—and here is a clear lesson for new governance—the
inadequacy of Basel II style capital adequacy conditions were virtually a
laboratory experiment of the failure of the kind of decentralized, firmbased contextual information gathering and process development that
underpins new governance and principles-based systems. Firms‘ selfinterest, competence, and understanding of their own businesses were
expected to keep the Basel II capital reserve system viable. As it turned
out, in the absence of external discipline, the bank-developed models
produced extraordinarily insufficient capital reserves, unprecedentedly
high leverage, and enormous systemic risk.69
Regulatory faith in industry actors‘ competence, if not literally their
bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic effect. George
Soros has charged that the GFC reflects a ―shocking abdication of
responsibility‖ on the part of regulators.70 Investment banks and others
engaged in originating, structuring and selling financial products
engaged in breathtakingly bad behavior. There was real dishonesty.71 The
firms also made grave errors in safeguarding even their own interests. In
the hands of in-house financial economists, academic caveats about the
limitations of EMT models72 as well as limits of valuation models were
ploughed under.73 Predictable psychological irrationalities, including
groupthink, overconfidence, self-serving biases, and excessive faith in
―hard‖ numbers, also seem to have been at work within firms. They were
not accounted for in the regulatory decision to devolve the details to
industry. There is also a strong public choice narrative. Banks had little
incentive to behave prudently in building tranches of consumer debtbased securities because they sold them onto third parties, in a market

68.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 777–78 (2009).
69.
Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1.
70.
George Soros, The Worst Market Crisis in 60 Years, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2008, at 9.
71.
See, e.g., Les Christie, Mortgage Fraud Still Soaring, CNN.COM, Aug. 26,
2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/25/real_estate/soaring_mortgage_fraud/
index.htm; Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at
MM36.
72.
For a discussion of the future of the ―efficient-markets hypothesis‖ see
Efficiency and Beyond, ECONOMIST, July 18, 2009.
73.
See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009,
at MM24 (describing oversimplification of the VAR model in banking practice); Felix
Salmon, A Formula for Disaster, WIRED MAG., Mar. 2009, at 74 (describing
oversimplification of Li‘s gaussian cupola in banking practice).
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eager to buy them.74 At a structural level, financial institutions may have
focused on short-term gain at the expense of long-term value because
they had become public corporations, not partnerships, and because bank
CEOs were compensated based on short term earnings.75
Regulators also seem to have underestimated the degree to which
industry actors would use the available flexibility to try to avoid or
circumvent regulatory oversight. Whether out of short-term self-interest,
economic pressure, or simple lack of understanding,76 firms within the
CSE Program that applied the alternative net capital requirements valued
illiquid assets too generously, underestimated long tail risks, and
maintained inadequate capital buffers, all the while taking the position
that their behavior was reducing rather than exacerbating risk. They
innovated in structured products, not only reflecting increasing
sophistication or in order to make their product more attractive to
purchasers, but also sometimes to avoid regulation.77 They avoided
comparability in order to reduce transparency and arguably to make it
harder for regulators to understand what they were selling.78
Each of these factors, even in isolation, represents a considerable
challenge to what Julia Black has termed the ―regulatory Utopia,‖ within
which the self-examining, responsible firm, which possesses the greatest

74.
Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association
of Economics (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2005/200503102/ (referring to a global ―saving glut‖).
75.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1410072; see also Michael Lewis, The End, CONDE NAST PORTFOLIO, Dec.Jan. 2008–09, at 114 (blaming Wall Street excesses on the decision to take investment
banks public).
76.
David Brooks, Op.-Ed., Greed and Stupidity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at
A29 (contrasting two theories explaining decision-making failures at financial
institutions). Precisely why financial institutions managed risk so poorly is an important
question, the answer to which is also multi-factorial and variable from one firm to
another.
77.
This may be the least of it. As Martin Wolf has pointed out, ―an enormous
part of what banks did in the early part of this decade—the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the
derivatives and the ‗shadow banking system‘ itself—was to find a way round regulation.‖
Martin Wolf, Comment, Reform of Regulation has to Start by Altering Incentives, FIN.
TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 11.
78.
See JONATHAN GOLIN, COVERED BONDS: BEYOND PFANDBRIEFE –
INNOVATIONS, INVESTMENT AND STRUCTURED ALTERNATIVES 323 (2006) (indicating the
lack of legislation in the American market for covered bonds, which produces products
which lack the standardization and comparability of their European counterparts). Recent
legislative initiatives have seen an interest in standardizing certain OTC derivative
products, in an effort to mitigate systemic risk, see, e.g., “Over-the-Counter Derivatives”
Before the S. Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., and Inv. (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/white20090622a.htm (statement of
Patricia White, Associate Director, Division of Research Statistics).
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contextual information, helps to elaborate the content of principles-based
regulation through ongoing dialogue with a flexible and outcomeoriented regulator, in the service of the mutual goal of optimized
regulation.79
Meanwhile, regulators at the SEC and elsewhere were dealing with
an inadequate regulatory mandate and insufficient resources. For
example, the SEC‘s Division of Trading and Markets had only seven
staffers and no Executive Director.80 Yet since March 2007 it was
charged the CSE Program—that is, with overseeing five otherwiseunregulated major broker-dealer firms, which formed the backbone of
the U.S.-based shadow-banking industry, based on a novel alternative
capital adequacy method.81 One of the effects of understaffing was that
Trading and Markets staff had not completed any inspections of its
subject firms in the eighteen months prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns
in September 2008.82 CSE staff failed to adequately track material issues
in regulated firms, approved changes to capital requirements before
completing full inspections, and failed to exchange information with
other SEC divisions.83 This would have been problematic in any event, of
course, but it was even more catastrophic in an outcome-oriented system
where so much of the detailed procedural design for achieving regulatory
goals was delegated to industry.
The Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom highlighted very
similar problems within its financial regulator, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA). The FSA was also far from adequately staffed. Its
Major Retail Groups Division was reduced by some twenty staff between
2004 and 2008, notwithstanding that Division‘s responsibility for
substantial and complex FSA priorities such as Basel II and the Treating

79.
Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 55, at 7–12.
80.
CSE REPORT, supra note 65, at 49.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 49–50.
83.
Id. at 37–41. The SEC‘s failures in oversight do not appear to be limited to
the CSE program. That agency‘s review of its failure to detect and prevent Bernard
Madoff‘s fraud also records that Mr. Madoff‘s funds were overseen by inexperienced or
unsuitably skilled staff who conducted inadequate examinations, failed to verify
information, and failed to respond to ―red flags.‖ SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS,
REPORT NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD
MADOFF‘S PONZI SCHEME – PUBLIC VERSION 23, 29, 31, 144 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm. Investigations were also
delayed, questions were left unresolved, and SEC offices failed to communicate with
each other. Id. The SEC‘s post-Madoff reforms include many of the initiatives
recommended here, such as conducting surprise exams, recruiting staff with specialized
experience, improving staff training, and seeking more resources. SEC, The Securities
and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm.
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Customers Fairly initiative, in addition to its core firm risk assessment
work.84 The postmortem account of regulatory failure in the Northern
Rock case identified a number of instances in which the FSA failed to
collect, or did not have access to, the information necessary to accurately
access the systemic risk that bank posed.85 Supervisors were found not to
have been ―proactive in ensuring there was a robust process that meant
they built up a complete picture of issues.‖86 The FSA acknowledged
extraordinarily high turnover of FSA staff directly supervising the bank,
inadequate numbers of staff, and very limited direct contact with bank
executives among the reasons for its ―unacceptable‖ regulatory
performance.87
In retrospect, programs like the CSE Program and the FSA‘s
understaffed application of principles-based regulation are internally
incoherent, at least if one believes in a role for public regulation. On one
hand, regulators justified the delegation of risk assessment to firms on
the basis that regulators did not and could not possess the knowledge
those firms had about their own operational risks. Yet, the compensatory
steps that might have reduced the knowledge gap and ensured sufficient
oversight—compliance audits, close supervision by adequate numbers of
well-trained staff—were not taken. Whether because the regimes‘
regulator-level architects accepted too unthinkingly the laissez-faire
ethos of recent years,88 or because they had no choice given their lack of
regulatory mandate from legislators89 (and these two are connected),
regulatory programs like the SEC‘s CSE Program lacked a commitment
to a robust public role in either design or implementation.
84.
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION, THE SUPERVISION OF
NORTHERN ROCK: A LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 7, 108–21 (2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk.pubs/other/nr_report.pdf.
85.
Id. at 13–59.
86.
Id. at 5. But see Norma Cohen & Chris Giles, Northern Rock Risk Revealed
in 2004, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/4cc9637a-4c8a-11de-a6c5-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1 (reporting that
the FSA had conducted ―war games‖ in 2004 that identified the systemic risk that
Northern Rock posed).
87.
Hector Sants, Chief Executive, Financial Services Authority, Speech at the
FSA Annual Public Meeting (July 24, 2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/
Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/0724_hs.shtml.
88.
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 45–49 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.
uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW] (criticizing the FSA for
adopting ―laissez faire‖ mentality); Labaton, supra note 69 (noting that ―[t]he
commission‘s decision effectively to outsource its oversight to the firms themselves fit
squarely in the broader Washington culture of the last eight years under President Bush‖).
89.
CSE REPORT, supra note 65, at 81–82 (Chairman Cox‘s comments
justifying CSE program on the basis that it was voluntary and the SEC did not have a
mandate to regulate CSEs otherwise).
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C. Clever People: Destabilization, Complexity, and Power in
Securitization Practice
As alluded to above, the over-the-counter market for derivatives
expanded enormously in the years leading up to the GFC, and has been
highly under-regulated.90 Devolution accompanied by an ideology of
self-regulation was especially problematic because of the conditions of
extraordinary complexity that characterized these products and the
market for them. The second narrative focused on the troubles caused by
devolving risk assessment to private parties under the Basel II and CSE
Program initiatives, without ensuring meaningful regulatory oversight.
This next narrative tries to confront a phenomenon that is equally
relevant to the financial crisis and to new governance thinking, but also
thornier.
At the core of new governance is an embrace of the challenge and
the promise of destabilization and social plasticity.91 New governance
values incrementalism and learning-by-doing, as it should, because new
governance starts from the premise that in an increasingly complex and
decentered (or at least polycentric and networked) world, the path to
human flourishing is through permitting innovation and parallel
experimentation, and creating flexible and revisable structures that open
the door to new possibilities.92 The difficulty is that bold, decentralized
innovation and the deconstruction of traditional legal structures were
centrally implicated in the GFC, in the form of structured finance
products. The point here is certainly not that the innovations that took
place in structured finance represent a new governance regime in some
fashion. They do not. All the same, their story is a cautionary tale about
some potential effects of innovation and complexity on transparency,
accountability, and power.
Briefly, a derivative is a financial product whose value is derived
from the value of one or more underlying assets. The underlying asset
can be virtually anything—a currency index, a loan agreement, or a
company‘s shares—but the most familiar kinds of derivatives are options
and swaps based on the value of underlying corporate shares. Options,
swaps, and analogous tools have been used for years to fine-tune
particular investment strategies; to hedge against risks associated with
currency fluctuations, company performance, credit, and other relevant

90.
See Labaton & O‘Brien, supra note 66.
91.
See generally Simon & Sabel, supra note 7. The concept of destabilization
rights is borrowed from Unger. See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 1–8, 530–
32 (1987). I am not suggesting that new governance envisions a world as plastic as Unger
does. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
92.
See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7.
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variables; and to speculate on the same things. Securitization is a second
order process that, in one version, uses derivatives to transform an
illiquid asset pool (for example, a collection of subprime mortgages),
structured through a conduit entity or special purpose vehicle, into
multiple, credit-ratable tranches of sellable new securities.93 A
securitized product based on underlying debt obligations, such as
mortgages or consumer credit card debt, is a consolidated debt obligation
(CDO). CDOs require considerable financial expertise to structure, but
while notorious, they—and the credit default swaps, or CDSs, that were
designed to serve as a form of insurance for them—are not the most
complex structured products that have been developed by financial
institutions. Global financial firms produced an ever greater volume of
ever-more-complex synthetic securities in recent years, and it all sold.94
Securitization can bring real benefits in terms of hedging and risk
management. After a certain point, however, those benefits are extracted
and additional innovation exists primarily to serve speculators, to move
risk downstream, and to generate book-level financial value that exists at
a metaphysical remove from the ―real‖ economy. This poses great risk to
systemic stability. Even taken on their own terms—in terms of the
benefits that structured products confer for fine-tuning risk profiles and
improving investor choice—by design or in effect, at some point the
costs of innovative new products outweigh their benefits to overall social
welfare. As the March 2009 Turner Review from the United Kingdom
suggested, the GFC has challenged the ―underlying assumption of
financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the world . . . that
financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since market discipline
will winnow out any unnecessary or value destructive innovations.‖95 On
the contrary, in retrospect, some recent forms of financial innovation
delivered few benefits, but permitted rent-seeking and contributed to
significantly increased levels of systemic risk.96 As the Turner Review
noted,

93.
See, e.g., Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic Securitization: Use of
Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 541 (2002);
Michael Durrer, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduits, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 119
(1997). Not incidentally, conduits also allowed banks to move debt off their balance
sheets and to maintain less capital on hand for purposes of Basel II and the CSE Program.
Other significant difficulties with the incentive structures around structured finance,
including the fact that through CDSs one could effectively buy more protection than one
had risk exposure, are beyond this Article‘s scope.
94.
See Bernanke, supra note 74 (discussing the global ―saving glut‖ and its
effect on the U.S. current account deficit); Lewis, supra note 75 (discussing the subprime
mortgage crisis).
95.
TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88, at 49.
96.
Id. at 109.
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it seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring
and trading activity involved in the complex version of
securitised credit [over the last ten to fifteen years], was not
required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently. Instead, it
achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by the
opacity of margins, the asymmetry of information and
knowledge between end users of financial services and
producers, and the structure of principal/agent relationships
between investors and companies and between companies and
individual employees.97
Derivatives and the development of increasingly sophisticated
structured financial products have also increased uncertainty and
destabilized preexisting accommodations in at least two significant ways.
First, at the corporate-law level, derivatives have ―shattered the atom‖ of
property well beyond anything contemplated by Berle and Means.98 This
has reduced transparency, undermined corporate governance principles,
and put even greater power into the hands of the most powerful and
sophisticated market actors. Second, the origination and sale of
securitized products have introduced enormous complexity into global
financial markets. This has affected those markets‘ functioning, and
presents a profound challenge to their regulation.
The effect of the derivatives revolution99 on corporate law and
governance have been described in a series of articles by Henry T.C. Hu
and Bernard Black.100 As they point out, corporate governance has long
been premised on a proportional relationship between economic interest
and shareholder votes: one share, one vote.101 This relationship gives
97.
Id. at 49.
98.
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 8–9 (1932).
99.
The term is not a new one. For a prescient analysis of the systemic risk
associated with widespread use of over-the-counter derivatives, see Mary L. Schapiro,
Comm‘r, SEC, Remarks at the Eighth Annual Symposium for the Foundation for
Research in International Banking and Finance: The Derivatives Revolution and the
World Financial System (Oct. 14, 1993), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/1993/101493schapiro.pdf [hereinafter Schapiro Remarks].
100. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625
(2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling ]; Henry T.C. Hu &
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811–908 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote
Buying ]. In September 2009, Professor Hu was appointed the first Director of the SEC‘s
newly established Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Announces New Division of Risk, Strategy, & Financial Innovation (Sept. 16,
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-199.htm.
101. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 100, at 851–52.
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shareholders the incentive to exercise their voting power responsibly,
makes possible the market for corporate control, and legitimizes the
power of management. Derivatives have the power to sever that
relationship. They allow investors (often, hedge funds) as well as
corporations to engage in what Hu and Black call ―the new vote buying,‖
by decoupling voting rights from economic ownership.102
For example, a shareholder can use equity swaps or options to hold
more votes, as of the record date for a shareholder vote, than it actually
owns.103 Holding a disproportionate number of votes has clear
implications in a proxy fight. In an extreme situation, it can even mean
that a vote holder has a negative economic interest in the wellbeing of
the company and, thus, an incentive to vote in ways that reduce share
value.104 The opposite phenomenon is ―hidden,‖ or ―morphable,‖
ownership, through which a shareholder uses derivatives, such as equity
swaps, to maintain a greater economic interest in a company than it has
votes. Hu and Black describe this as ―morphable‖ voting rights, because
the shareholder often maintains the de facto ability to acquire the votes if
needed, for example by unwinding its swaps.105 Ownership is ―hidden‖ in
that the shareholder‘s economic stake and de facto voting ownership are
often not disclosed. The ability to make one‘s voting rights disappear
when one wants to hide a stake, only to reappear when needed, has
obvious implications in the takeover context, and the decoupling of
voting right from economic interest has significant effects for corporate
law and governance generally.106
Moreover, Hu and Black assert that this decoupling is really just one
instance of a broader, global trend, generally not addressed by regulation,
toward decoupling the bundles of rights and obligations we traditionally
know as equity and debt.107 It bears noting that sophisticated parties are
the ones most able to take advantage of the power of this flexibility,
which is beyond the capacity of small or retail investors. The collapse of
structure and the increased irrelevance of formal voting rights for all
shareholders benefits the powerful.108
In addition to undermining conventional corporate governance
mechanisms and notions of property, derivatives beget complexity. One
of the striking lessons from the GFC has been the impact of complexity

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
49 (1991).

Id. at 823.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 832–35.
Id. at 825–26.
Id. at 836–42, 850–63.
See generally Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling, supra note 100.
Cf., e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–
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on the financial markets, and the degree to which existing regulatory
structures failed to manage its effects. Steven Schwarcz has suggested,
plausibly, that complexity is the ―greatest financial market challenge of
the future.‖109 He describes complexity in the assets that underlie modern
structured financial products—for example, variability in property
values, interest rates, mortgage terms, and the creditworthiness of
individual mortgagees110—over layered with complexity in the design of
the structured products themselves—for example, in the design of
synthetic products so complex that adequate disclosure to investors was
virtually impossible111—and exacerbated by complexity in modern
financial markets (including indirect holding systems and the widespread
use of complex mathematical risk modeling).112 Schwarcz examines how
these multiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending standards,
failures of disclosure, and a lack of transparency and even
comprehensibility.113 Perhaps most difficult to manage, they also create a
complex system characterized by intricate causal relationships and a
―tight coupling‖ within credit markets, in which events tend to amplify
each other and move rapidly into crisis mode.114 Prior to the GFC, there
was a general failure by all concerned to appreciate the myriad
interrelated ways in which complexity can impair markets and financial
regulation.
III. LESSONS LEARNED
The three narratives above are pitched in different registers, though
all are stories through which one can try to understand how financial
regulation functions. Each one also offers lessons for new governance
scholarship, especially around three key concepts: incrementalism,
capacity, and plasticity.
A. Does Incrementalism Mean More of the Same?
As a design strategy, there are reasons to prefer experience-based
incrementalism to solo-designed regulatory reform undertaken by even
the most talented and experienced observers. Knowledge is dispersed

109. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2–3, on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract =1240863.
110. Id. at 7–11.
111. Id. at 11–25.
112. Id. at 25–32.
113. Id. at 7–11.
114. Id. at 25–31.
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within society, redundancy and parallel experiments are useful learning
methods, and the extent of what we do not know is great enough that the
potential for activating unintended consequences must be seen as a real
risk.
At the same time, incrementalism inevitably reflects surrounding
conditions. It may be a powerful tool for change over time, but the
direction of that change will be a product of myriad distinct decisions
made along the way, and those decisions will be a function of the
interests of those making them and the extent of their influence. New
governance scholarship is preoccupied with the fascinating possibilities
inhering in incrementalism—and indeed, many large and beneficial
changes have been produced through incremental, pragmatic action. It is
one of the key insights of new governance that one should design
deliberative and regulatory regimes that can capture and fine-tune that
progress by reflecting learning back to those doing the doing, evaluate it
based on sound and revisable methods, and roll that learning back into
the regime itself.
As important as this is, it would be unwise to underestimate the
amount of energy and focus required to push incremental change (or
even to identify its direction, given the background noise) in the direction
of prior commitments and empirically demonstrable improvement.
Moreover, under stable background conditions and without that
enormous input of energy, incremental movement is very likely to reflect
status quo priorities and power relations. Consider the example of
monitorships. In many (though not all) of the monitorships we studied,
incremental decisions taken at each stage meant that at no stage was
there a true destabilization along the lines imagined by new governance
scholarship. There was no opening up of the process to a more diverse
set of interests.
In practical terms, the ―local level‖ in new governance regulation
cannot be a black box. Moreover, we cannot presume that publicregarding or long term thinking will automatically be produced at this
level. Without a considerable oversight mechanism that tests those
groups‘ assumptions, those groups will develop suboptimal resolutions.
For example, a local level comprised of self-interested bankers cannot be
counted on to self-regulate effectively where no one is acting as an
active, public-regarding counterweight in their interpretive community.
What this means is that we should perhaps be wary of industry efforts
toward ―pre-emptive self-regulation.‖ We should not assume that
regulators will necessarily be able to adapt measures that were initially
taken to pre-empt regulation into a more consequential project. At a
minimum, the monitorship story here points to features that have to be
incorporated in order to translate self-regulation, especially of the preemptive variety, to truly enforced self-regulation or co-regulation. Above
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all, it would be essential to reinject meaningful contestation and
diversity. Without structural avenues for intervention by those with
allegiances truly ―outside the circle,‖115 we should anticipate seeing
closed, non-diverse, and ultimately unaccountable systems.
B. Who Cares About Regulatory Capacity? The Tendency to Slide
Downhill
The absence of meaningful accountability meant that Basel II and
the CSE Program effectively ran downhill toward self-regulation. This
need not have been the case. Devolution does not automatically imply
weak public oversight or irresponsible private action. The Turner
Review, produced by the FSA‘s now-Chairman, Lord Adair Turner is
insightful in describing the regulatory worldview that made possible
regulatory failure on the scale we have seen.116 According the Turner
Review, the FSA did not fail because it embraced principles-based
regulation.117 Rather, Lord Turner ascribes blame to flaws in FSA
philosophy—that is, to a hands-off, market-based regulatory approach
that assumed that markets were generally self-correcting and that market
discipline could be counted on to contain risk; that primary responsibility
for managing risk lay with senior management, not regulators, because
they possessed better information; and that consumers were best
protected through unfettered and transparent markets, not product
regulation or direct intervention.118
New governance scholarship cuts across the proverbial
public/private divide in many ways, one of which is that it takes
seriously, as governance strategies, initiatives occurring within
regulatory bodies,119 on the part of private actors,120 and at junctions in

115. This would include, for example, meaningful protections for corporate
whistleblowers. See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and
the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 2009 CAL. L. REV. 433.
116. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88.
117. This notwithstanding premature and ultimately inaccurate reports by
credible UK media sources that principles-based regulation would be abandoned. See
Peter Thal Larsen & Jennifer Hughes, Sants Takes a Fresh View of Regulator’s
Principles, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at 17.
118. Just as fundamental, but best put in the category of regulatory gaps rather
than regulatory approaches, was failure in the oversight of systemic risk. See TURNER
REVIEW, supra note 88, at 52–53.
119. E.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7; Noonan et al., supra note 54.
120. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2008); Katharina
Pistor, Global Network Finance: Organizational Hedging in Times of Uncertainty
(Columbia Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 339, Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284606.
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between.121 One lesson that emerges from the failure of internal risk
assessment under Basel II and the CSE Program is that, while
traditionally ―public‖ and traditionally ―private‖ actors should not be
drawn reductively, and while each can perform a range of different
functions, they nevertheless operate from distinct starting positions.
Neither group, of course, would want to see the financial system
collapse, but in the shorter term private parties can be expected to be
driven principally by profits, market share, and interfirm competition.
We may hope for them to generate reputation-driven accountability
measures in at least certain contexts,122 but in the meantime they are
susceptible to taking shortcuts and satisficing in ways that may be
individually beneficial even if they are collectively catastrophic. One
cannot expect industry actors to act in the public interest, except insofar
as that public interest conforms to their understanding of their own
(sometimes short term) self-interest, and there will be a non-negligible
number of circumstances in which they will not conform. For example,
each firm operating under the SEC‘s CSE Program had the incentive to
minimize capital reserves and to maximize leverage, in the interest of
maximizing profits. The result was a classic collective action problem.123
Excessively deep faith in the public potential of self-interested
private actors can impose other blinkers as well. One risk may be an
unreflective over-embrace of localism and local knowledge. As new
governance scholars know, the principle of subsidiarity asserts that
responsibility for addressing a particular problem should be located at the
most local level capable of handling it. In retrospect, if any party was in a
position to assess the systemic risk that arose from the tightly
interconnected conduct of the global banks in recent years, it could only
plausibly have been a regulator. The assumption that local actors possess
the best information seems to have been accepted too uncritically, and
applied too sweepingly.124

121. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 7 (describing situations in which
private action can be catalyzed by a publicly mandated process); Joanne Scott & Susan
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007); Sturm, supra note 8.
122. See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 120.
123. See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on
Buy-Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html (statement of Charles Prince,
Citigroup CEO) (―As long as the music is playing you need to get up and dance.‖).
124. Cf. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) (arguing that the conservative political spin the
principle sometimes assumes misconstrues the public-minded Catholic social theory from
which the principle arises).
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Similarly, the Basel II Accord and CSE Program did not account for
the possibility that self-interested private actors could collectively
cascade into risky and irrational behavior. Information-based analysis
and reason-giving (essential elements of new governance thinking)125
also seem to collapse in times of economic exuberance, when those
involved are more willing to suspend disbelief. Market bubbles may also
be times when regulators‘ budgets are under pressure, because problems
are not at the forefront of peoples‘ minds. The duty to give reasons and
explain is further hampered by extreme complexity of the sort that
characterizes modern financial markets. Being more flexible, new
governance methods may reflect the zeitgeist more forcefully as well.
Working effectively with principles-based regulation and similar
decentered models therefore requires considerable changes to traditional
regulatory culture, and considerable resources.126 Indeed, as Julia Black
has pointed out—and this seems crucial for new governance generally—
principles-based regulation may be more ―hands-off‖ in its approach to
the procedural details, but this does not mean that it requires fewer
regulatory resources.127 Principles-based regulation may actually require
intensive interaction with firms, at least around certain issues or
situations.128 It means having an adequate number of staff, and giving
regulators the ability to obtain transparent and reliable information from
and about industry. It requires that regulators have and use robust
investigatory powers where necessary, conduct regular and adequate
compliance audits, and possess the quantitative expertise and relevant
experience to independently scrutinize information. As one commentator
observed, contemporary regulators need to be pursuing ―the same PhD
rocket scientists the banks are chasing.‖129 Regulatory staffers also need
sufficient confidence in their own judgment and a healthy degree of
skepticism about industry. Yet, both the FSA and the SEC‘s CSE

125. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 181–82 (2004).
126. See, e.g., Black et al., Making a Success, supra note 59, at 201; Cristie L.
Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis,
55 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract
=1516734.
127. Black et al., Making a Success, supra note 59, at 202.
128. See generally id. (discussing U.K. Treat Customers Fairly rules, which
require registrants to demonstrate that they are in fact treating customers fairly at every
stage).
129. Jennifer Hughes, FSA Admits Catalogue of Failures, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2008, at 3. The fact that quantitative analysis has been abused, misapplied, and
overgeneralized in the past does not mean that banks will not use it in the future. Despite
its theoretical limitations and the recent example of real-life catastrophe, quantitative
analysis continues to have substantial predictive value, and it will continue to be a central
tool for financial industry actors.
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Program were under-resourced on virtually every measure.130 In a system
where information is power, such as in the principles-based regulation of
complex derivative instruments, a regulator without the ability to obtain
and manage information cedes the field to those it regulates.
Herein lies the problem. Who, precisely, can be relied on to ensure
that such decentralized systems are accountable, and that learning truly is
reflected upward and used effectively? Who has the incentive to do this
rather than to ―satisfice‖? Consider again the example of corporate
monitorships. Certainly, each of the prosecutor, the corporation, and the
monitor had an interest in achieving some measurable positive effect
through the process. But they also each had some degree of common
interest in resolving the monitorship in the least destabilizing and most
efficient manner possible. We should not then be surprised that, where
there was room to satisfice, and given the absence of a forceful, external,
destabilizing accountability mechanism, incremental decisions at each
stage downgraded their potential effectiveness. Considering the lack of
appetite for long-term, close monitoring of public companies—by
securities regulators, let alone by criminal prosecutors—we may
reasonably ask ourselves exactly how this regime could ever be robust.131
The lesson seems to be that moving people and organizations out of
complacent stasis (or, worse, regulatory collapse) and toward
meaningful, accountable new governance functionality calls for a
substantially larger push than the new governance literature always
130. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. The FSA implemented a
―supervisory enhancement program‖ in response to the failure of Northern Rock. See
Hector Sants, Fin. Servs. Auth., The FSA‘s Supervisory Enhancement Programme, in
Response to the Internal Audit Report on Supervision of Northern Rock, High Level
Summary (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/
enhancement.pdf. It has announced plans to enhance its supervisory teams (meaning
more staff, better training, a mandatory minimum number of staff per high-impact
institution, and closer contact between senior staff and the biggest firms). Id. at 2. It also
plans to improve the quality of its staff, hiring risk specialists to support frontline
supervision teams by focusing on the complex models used by banks to gauge financial
risk. Id. at 3. See also TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88, at 88 (describing the FSA‘s new
approach as ―intensive supervision‖). Lord Turner describes intensive supervision as
entailing much greater resources devoted to the supervision of high impact firms, more
intense focus on business strategies and system-wide risks, more focus on technical
competence of FSA supervisors, more focus on the details of bank accounting, and
greater willingness to reach judgments about the overall risks that firms are running. Id.
131. See Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 726 (discussing civil side regulators
passing monitors‘ reports onto compliance for use as blueprints). That said, even within
the civil regulatory context, there is a clear distinction between regulated entities and
public companies in terms of follow-up and oversight. Broker-dealer firms and other
regulated entities operate in a highly regulated environment and are required to be in
contact with their regulators through a number of prescribed mechanisms. Nothing
similar is required of public companies as a condition of listing, and most people would
probably agree that nothing similar should be required.
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acknowledges. Moreover, the push would have to be continuous and
unrelenting, since the same tendencies toward satisficing, pie-dividing,
and short term thinking will reemerge at many crucial decision points
along the way. A new governance approach to regulation will be
susceptible to downgrading throughout its life cycle. Designing a system
that can maintain its integrity despite such human foibles will require a
greater degree of ambition than has characterized many implementation
efforts.
C. Destabilization Rights and Prophylactic Rules
New governance scholarship seeks to develop governance
mechanisms that in terms of flexibility, effectiveness, and inclusiveness
are superior to command-and-control mechanisms. This makes sense. In
part, the roots of new governance thought (for example, in new public
management or Japanese management models) represent a reaction to
bureaucracies and hierarchies that had become ineffective because of
over-reliance on rigid rule-making processes and centralized decision
making structures, or because of co-optation by interest group politics.
Today, the problems caused by derivatives and securitization reflect
practically the opposite risk—innovation bounded only by the
imagination, in a financial sector increasingly distanced from the ―real
economy‖ and free from the constraining influences of rigid institutions
and legal structures.132 Moreover, in real life that flexibility was not used
in the service of greater emancipation or human potential.133 Until it
proved to be to the detriment of everyone, financial product innovation
primarily benefited financial firms themselves, at great cost to
transparency and the possibility of oversight. We should therefore get
clear about the boundaries of the destabilization right that is fundamental
to new governance.
Destabilization in new governance does not mean free-for-all
plasticity. Radical uncertainty on its own it is neither necessary nor

132. See, e.g., Bell & Dawson, supra note 93, at 561 (suggesting that synthetic
securitization ―is the second great leap forward in the road to a totally disintermediated
financial world‖).
133. Contra UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 91, at 530 (―Destabilization
rights protect the citizen‘s interest in breaking open the large-scale organizations or the
extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the destabilizing effects of
ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated hierarchies of power and advantage.‖);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 210 (1987)
(―The paramount condition of material progress [once poverty is overcome] becomes the
plasticity of social life: the relative ease with which people can subject their forms of
production and exchange, of machine design and work organization, to the logic of
problem-solving.‖).
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sufficient to generate the conditions for human flourishing. New
governance understands this, of course. It is not anarchism, or radical
democracy theory, and it situates its destabilization mechanism within a
matrix of abiding institutions.134 At the same time, conditions of deep
instability are sometimes proposed as the moment when New
Governance approaches stand the best chance of being realized—times
when no one knows what the solution to a problem might be, or how to
get there, but everyone knows that the status quo cannot persist.135
Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott similarly describe a
promising ―contracting for innovation‖ phenomenon arising around
interfirm collaboration, as a response to what they understand as a
problem of Knightian uncertainty.136
Good and important things do happen in malleable environments.
There is real power in the new governance conviction that moving
people off their pre-existing positions can open new and unexpected
possibilities. At the same time, we might be forgiven in this historical
moment for fixating on the bad things that can also happen in malleable
environments. The financial crisis is partly a story about the fallibility of
industry actors in safeguarding their own enlightened self-interest,
behaving rationally, and responding to (or perhaps even grasping) the
systemic risk their conduct was generating. Considerable human
experience in fact suggests that in the face of uncertainty, bounded
human rationality has considerable presence. People may satisfice where
possible to avoid the discomfort of uncertainty; will be more inclined to
accept the status quo for the same reason; will have difficulty absorbing
information that is inconsistent with their prior convictions and interests;
and sometimes, may freeze up completely or revert to tribalism.
As regulatory failure in principles-based regimes and Schwarcz‘s
dissection of financial complexity show, unknowability is a real threat to
systems based on information-forcing and analysis. In addition, power
relationships assert themselves in fluid space, like the space created
between ownership and voting rights through mechanisms such as empty
voting and morphable ownership. Nontransparency can be beneficial to
powerful actors. Those that profit from it will resist efforts to force

134. See, e.g., Noonan et al., supra note 54; Sabel & Simon, supra note 7; Scott
& Sturm, supra note 121.
135. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2131–34 (2005) (arguing for open-ended formulations
where the regulator ―knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know the means
for achieving it, when circumstances are likely to change in ways that the [regulator]
cannot predict, or when the [regulator] does not even know the precise result that she
desires‖).
136. Gilson et al., supra note 120.
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transparency and accountability—and resist those efforts both overtly,
and in hard-to-measure ways.137
So, what to do? Unger‘s response to the derivatives problem would
probably be that we have not gone far enough. The use of structured
financial products has atomized equity, and debt, but a broadly available
destabilization right (for example, a power to profoundly disrupt the
status quo, available not only to shareholders but all stakeholders
including creditors, employees, local communities, citizens writ large,
and representatives of the global environment) did not follow.138
Consolidated property holding, also, remains with us.139 The result is the
persistence of a hollowed-out legacy mechanism for ensuring voice
through shareholder voting, which is no longer connected to the central
interests to be protected, and that is available to be used strategically by
sophisticated parties.
Be that as it may, both the GFC and the regulatory response to it
suggest that the establishment of broadly available destabilization rights
is unlikely to follow the disintegration of formal property rights. While it
is theoretically possible that ―ungoverned‖ mechanisms can create rich
accountability in the absence of formal mechanisms,140 this is not an
inevitable outcome. All three narratives above demonstrate that in a
world of imperfect information, complexity, and status quo bias, less
happy results, which reflect existing power relationships, may result.

137. See Sturm, supra note 8 (identifying such problems of subtle resistance, and
a solution based on building in responsive architecture rather than perpetuating
plasticity).
138. Unger actually proposes four fundamentally restructured categories of
rights: immunity rights, which protect the individual from the state, organizations, and
other individuals; destabilization rights, which make it possible to dismantle institutions
and practices that create social hierarchy and division; market rights, which constitute
claims to social capital and replace conventional property rights; and solidarity rights,
which are ―the legal entitlements of communal life.‖ UNGER, supra note 133, at 508–38.
139. For Unger, the traditional property right was an unhelpful formative context
that impeded societal plasticity. Unger would disaggregate private property rights and
transfer control over major productive assets to a ―rotating capital fund,‖ which would
disaggregate property rights down through tiers: (1) an ultimate social fund controlled by
government, leasing capital to (2) autonomous investment funds operating in different
sectors, which then (3) auction or ration resources to competitive teams of producers for
stipulated periods of time. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 91, at 491–501. Welfare
rights guarantees to citizens would protect them from the vagaries of markets, which
would also allow innovators (capital-takers) to be even more innovative and to take larger
risks. See also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE 273–75 (1987).
140. See, e.g., Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract
Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83, 86–87 & nn.12–14 (2008); Charles Sabel,
Ungoverned Production, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 310 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
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Even where acute problems associated with securitization are resolved, it
is not clear from where the impetus will come to generate a fundamental
revision of existing structures on Ungerian lines.
Another response to the problems posed by securitization might be
to try to reintroduce certainty in a convincing manner, for example by
shoring up non-negotiable substantive rights.141 Leaving aside the
considerable torque this would put on new governance methods, this
does not seem realistic in this situation. There is virtually no hope of
returning the twin genies of innovation and complexity in structured
products to the bottle.142 The reassertion of facially straightforward rights
cannot make a complex situation simple, or avoid the need for ongoing
and explicit principles-based problem-solving that is designed to handle
complexity. New governance needs to be understood as a response to
those very real problems.
Perhaps, though, in light of finite regulatory capacity and the clear
necessity of decent prudential regulation for worldwide economic
stability, prophylactic rules have a role to play. They are far from
perfect, virtually by definition, but their overall costs may prove
justifiable relative to the costs of complete new governance systems that
are more iterative and complex ―all the way down,‖ if those complex
systems exceed the capacity of regulators to regulate.143
Without regulatory oversight, self-interested actors can be expected
to act in their own interest. Where there is underlying uncertainty
anyway—for example, around a new or extraordinarily complex product
or line of business—or where there is no metric for evaluating something
(a compliance program, a product, a risk) across institutions, the problem
of self-interested action can be exacerbated.144 Collectively, the infamous
―risky shift‖145 can occur, especially when markets are experiencing a

141. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance:
Lessons From Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL‘Y 117, 127–28, 180–84 (2009); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2009) (making essentially this recommendation albeit in different
contexts).
142. For example, one post-GFC innovation in securitization is based on ―life
settlements.‖ Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at A1.
143. On the other hand, prophylactic rules can impose considerable costs due to
international regulatory arbitrage. The obvious response, which is international
harmonization, remains elusive. I am grateful to Eric Pan for this observation.
144. See generally William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999).
145. See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); J.H.
Davis, Group Decision and Social Interaction: A Theory of Social Decision Schemes, 80
PSYCHOL. REV. 97 (1973). ―Risky shift‖ is part of a broader phenomenon of group
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bubble or competitive pressures push actors toward greater risk-taking.146
Without countervailing, independent-minded regulatory power to push
back against self-interested industry conduct, the ―creep‖ may run
downwards—to more risk, less transparency, less systemic stability, and
less consumer protection.
Meaningful regulatory oversight is therefore an important
consideration, and complexity makes that oversight harder to achieve.
We know now that our financial regulatory approaches were not built to
handle the effects of complexity and constant innovation that
characterize modern financial markets. The new governance approach
regulation is, of course, a response to those very phenomena. But as John
Coffee and Hillary Sale have argued, even an optimal regulatory model
will not work if it is too complex for regulators to implement.147 If the
alternative is a governance system without the capacity to provide
meaningful oversight, then the (ultimately superficial) certainty provided
by (inevitably imperfect) prophylactic rules may still be more functional
than the flexibility and contextuality offered by the more sophisticated
new governance approach. In other words, we need to take into account
both theory and realistic prospects for effective implementation when
deciding how to structure particular regulatory provisions.
We may also want to consider the role that particular regulatory
requirements play in overall system stability and efficiency. Rules
around capital requirements, like much of prudential regulation, are so
fundamental to effective functioning of the system that they should not
necessarily be subject to contestation, innovation, and potential ―creep‖
through collaborative regulatory practice. The analogy in democratic
theory would be to participation rights, seen by some to be so
fundamental to deliberation that they should not themselves be subject to
the risk of erosion in the process of that deliberative exercise.148
polarization, referred to as ―choice shift‖ in more recent academic work, though in this
case the narrower term ―risky shift‖ applies.
146. See Nakamoto & Wighton, supra note 123 (statement of Charles Prince)
(―As long as the music is playing, you‘ve got to get up and dance.‖).
147. Coffee & Sale, supra note 68, at 742, 782 (claiming that Basel II criteria
generated a ―very sophisticated tool that was beyond the capacity of the SEC‘s largely
legal staff to administer effectively‖ and that simple, suboptimal might be capable of
implementation while ―a more optimal rule (in terms of its theoretical design) may not
be‖).
148. See, e.g., Scott & Sturm, supra note 121, at 567. Strong safeguards for
participation rights, being fundamental to the new governance deliberative process, need
to be distinguished from providing guarantees to particular substantive outcomes, like the
―right of return‖ proposed in Alexander, supra note 141. There is an analogous debate in
new governance scholarship about the degree of ―hard law‖ background measures needed
(or assumed to exist) to safeguard participatory rights or address power disparities. See,
e.g., Amy Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33
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Returning to Basel II and the CSE Program, capital requirements are
a concrete example in which firms that were forced to observe more
rigid, rule-based requirements weathered the acute phase of the fall 2008
credit crisis better.149 In Canada, for example, capital requirements for
financial institutions were comparatively high, and tended even to be
exceeded by the actual practice of Canadian banks.150 Asset-to-capital
ratios were capped at a comparatively low level.151 Canadian financial
institutions‘ overall success in weathering the GFC has been often
attributed to these regulatory restrictions.152 Another example of
prophylactic provisions might be provisional contract term
standardization. Especially with respect to derivative contracts,
standardization can help cabin complexity, make innovation subject to a
degree of price discovery and oversight, and make derivatives easier to
regulate.153
We should be careful not to overstate the lesson here. The fact that
systems with rigid, mandatory capital requirements performed better
during the financial crisis does not mean that such capital requirements
will necessarily be better than any more flexible alternative, or that we
can generalize from capital requirements to other areas of financial
regulation. We did not learn that rigid capital requirements are better
than any mechanism we could possibly imagine. They may not even be
better than the CSE Program might have been, had it been buttressed by

LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 543 n.47 (2008). Even assuming that capital requirements and
other prudential measures are fundamental to financial markets‘ operation, a range of
reasonable opinion could exist as to the optimal degree of flexibility for what I still
maintain need to be prophylactic standards around them.
149. Andrea Beltratti & Rene Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better
During the Credit Crisis?: A Cross Country Study of the Impact of Governance and
Regulation (Fisher College of Business, Working Paper No. 2009-03-012, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1433502 (finding that
banks in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and with more
independent supervisors performed better in the July 2007 to December 2008 period).
150. See, e.g., Kevin G. Lynch, Clerk of the Privy Council, Secretary to the
Cabinet and Head of the Public Service to the Hertie School of Governance, Remarks in
Berlin, Germany: Public Policy Making in a Crisis: A Canadian Perspective (May 7,
2009).
151. Id.
152. But see Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, Why Are Canadian Banks More
Resilient? (IMF Working Paper, WP/09/152, 2009), available at https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09152.pdf (identifying the ―key determinant‖ of Canadian
banks‘ success as having a larger base of insured retail depositors). Other factors include
steadier housing prices, a more unified regulatory structure, and the fact that mortgage
lenders in Canada tend to hold the mortgages they extend. See Lynch, supra note 150;
Ratnovski & Huang, supra, at 16–18; Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 31.
153. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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adequate regulatory capacity. Rigid requirements impose significant
costs, as well. What we learned is that rigid capital requirements worked
better than the flawed and basically unaccountable capital adequacy
system that was in place under, for example, the SEC‘s CSE Program.
It is helpful to see our current struggles with complexity as
epistemological ones.154 Complexity is worrisome right now in part
because, like the frozen credit markets in fall 2008, we do not know what
we do not know. In time, based on greater understanding, we may be
able to develop a more sophisticated approach to complexity, with more
and different safeguards in place, which does not seem to force us to
choose so starkly between flexibility and systemic stability. In other
words, tools like bright line capital requirements should be cast as
prophylactic, not permanent, rules. Prophylactic rules are clear and
generally overdrawn requirements, like the Miranda rights-reading
requirement on police in the United States, which serve as placeholders
to protect an important interest until and unless a better, more tailored
method for achieving the same end can be implemented.155 A ―better‖
approach to capital requirements would have to improve flexibility and
congruence, but not at the expense of the transparency, accountability,
and ease of application that rigid requirements provide in this crucial
aspect of financial markets regulation.156
Prophylactic rules are helpful in keeping essential systems
functioning and in conserving regulatory resources. However, under

154. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity,
Causation, Law, and Judgment (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper
No.
09–30,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1421837.
155. The term derives from American constitutional law theory, and is
controversial in that context. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that
certain warnings must be given before a suspect‘s statement made during custodial
interrogation could be admitted in evidence). The case invited legislative action to protect
the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, but stated that any legislative
alternative must be ―at least as effective in appraising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.‖ Id. at 467. The Miranda
warning requirement was upheld in Dickerson v. United States, but its prophylactic
nature was severely narrowed and the warning requirement was constitutionalized. 530
U.S. 428 (2000). For a new governance perspective on prophylactic rules, see Dorf &
Sabel, supra note 7, at 452–59.
156. In Dickerson, arguments about costs and workability for law enforcement
personnel were made successfully in support of upholding the Miranda warning
requirements, notwithstanding the ―undeniabl[e] instances in which the exclusionary rule
of Miranda imposes costs on the truth-seeking function of a trial, by depriving the trier of
fact of ‗what concededly is relevant evidence.‘‖ Brief for the United States, at I,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), available at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1999/0responses/99-5525.resp.html; Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 442.
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conditions of underlying factual uncertainty, rigid rules cannot resolve
that uncertainty. They will paper over uncertainty, forcing difficult
interpretations underground—or alternatively forcing rule revisions
through legislative processes that are far too cumbersome to be
serviceable in ―live,‖ fast-moving systems. New governance style
regulation is a more promising long term response to extreme complexity
and consequent uncertainty, because it is about designing problemsolving architecture that can respond directly to situations where neither
the precise goal nor the means for achieving it can be determined in
advance. This is the kind of environment in which it makes sense to
enlist the context-specific knowledge of a broad band of stakeholders in
a collective, comparative, learning-by-doing regulatory project, while not
being naïve about the impact of self-interest and power.
IV. PUTTING PEOPLE AT THE CENTER OF REGULATORY DESIGN
In a recent work, ―Optimization and its Discontents,‖ Bill Simon
discussed the connection between new governance thought and recent
failures in banking regulation.157 As this Article also tries to point out,
both are, inter alia, systems that draw on local level knowledge and
implementation, aggregate it through a regulator, and operate from best
practices in industry rather than through command-and-control
regulation. In his paper, Simon draws a useful distinction between what
he calls the ―vulgar optimization‖ underpinning the failure of Basel II
initiatives, and ―designing for reliability‖ as new governance is meant to
do.158 Ultimately, Simon argues that Basel II, if it can indeed be seen as
having failed—something he does not automatically concede159—failed
as a result of unenlightened implementation.
Simon describes vulgar optimization on the part of industry actors
as being marked by reductionist analytical methods around risk that
missed weak signals, normalized the unexpected, and were not structured
to systematically learn from experience.160 In the run-up to the GFC,
vulgar optimization caused financial regulators to miss the dynamic, selfreinforcing nature of ―systemic risk‖ in a deregulatory environment,
especially ―liquidity risk,‖ ―network externalities‖, and the effect of

157. William H. Simon, Optimization and its Discontents in Regulatory Design:
Bank Regulation as an Example 3 (Columbia Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 10-224,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533446 (noting that ―some of the most
prominent pre-crisis regulatory initiatives, especially those associated with ‗Basel II‘ . . .
have a strong ‗new governance‘ and reliability flavor‖).
158. See generally id.
159. Id. at 3, 22–23.
160. Id. at 4–6, 20–23.

FORD - READ THROUGH.DOC

200x:nnn

6/9/2010 12:27 PM

Lessons from Financial Regulation

143

procyclical regulatory requirements.161 It also caused them to
mischaracterize Knightian uncertainty (the ―unknown unknowns‖) for
Knightian risk (the quantifiable ―known unknowns‖).162
Simon contrasts this approach with one based on ―designing for
reliability,‖ as new governance does.163 Designing for reliability folds in
prior experience with near misses, and employs root cause analysis and
deliberative processes to solve problems. Simon argues that what we are
seeing, in post-GFC reform proposals, is a turn to a more ―dynamic
perspective‖ that is more consistent with a real new governance
approach.164 For example, regulators are proposing mechanisms designed
to ensure continuous self-assessment, as with iterative, multi-round stress
tests; continuously shifting countercyclical capital reserve requirements;
and continuous validation of risk assessment models. Embedded into the
validation process is an appreciation of the importance of ―complex
judgment,‖ meaning professional human due diligence and not just risk
modeling; a more nuanced understanding of risk; more collaborative or
deliberative decision-making around a broader set of regulatory norms;
and more emphasis on and careful implementation of diagnostic and
comparative analysis (such as outlier analysis and benchmarking).165
All of this seems correct. Simon‘s analysis illustrates the sweeping
cognitive and methodological failures that underlay the failed
implementation of decentralized initiatives like Basel II and the CSE
Program. We should note, however, the reassertion of the need to design
methods for better rational analysis and deliberation, as a response to
reductionism and vulgar optimization. While I share these convictions
and cannot propose a better system than a new governance one based on
learning-by-doing, transparency, and the examination of root causes,
what recent experience in the financial markets teaches us is that we
should not underestimate the agency and energy required to make new
governance happen. Recognizing the large risks inherent in trying to
paint with a brush as broad as this one, I nevertheless draw three lessons
from recent experience in financial regulation.
First, new governance methods may simply not be feasible in some
contexts. In retrospect, the amount of energy required to move people off
their short term incentives turns out to be substantially more than was put
into the monitorship or CSE Program initiatives. In fact, it may even be
more than is politically palatable in some situations. It may not be
possible in all environments, given existing incentives and available
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 15–20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 6–12, 22–28.
Id. at 24–26.
Id. at 26–28.
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resources, to create and maintain meaningful and not just cosmetic new
governance initiatives. In other words, we need to consider that new
governance will not work everywhere. Where no one who is in a position
to influence the situation is prepared to build in accountability and
capacity, there will not be any, and that may happen unpleasantly often.
Second, the development of active contestation and deliberation
within new governance structures cannot be presumed. It must be
fostered, ensured, and protected. Reason-giving, problem identification,
and careful problem-solving techniques tend to collapse when everyone‘s
interests are aligned—during bubble times, for example, but also where
players‘ pre-existing incentives (combined with insufficient attention to
real destabilization) mean that cosmetic compliance is probably what
those players are ultimately prepared to settle for. One response to this is
to build in real diversity and internal contestation, and to take silence not
as consent but as an alarm bell. It may require much more serious
attention to ensuring that a full range of perspectives, including
perspectives unpopular with traditional ―insiders,‖ are at the table.
Greater diversity in perspectives should perhaps have been
introduced in the monitorship situation, but the point is broader than that.
Understanding how to structure in active contestation and deliberation
may ultimately call for a richer description of the relationships between
capital markets actors and the other crucial social, institutional, and
historical milieus in which they are embedded—to understand which
actors might ―keep their heads‖ and how to ensure their participation to
that end. In multiple and intricately connected ways, firm and industry
and broader culture can affect the degree to which parties are capable of
acting independently in the face of competitive pressures and behavioral
cascades. Goldman Sachs famously managed to avoid some of the worst
excesses in mortgage-backed securities, arguably as a result of its culture
of ―contrary thinking‖ relative to the rest of its industry.166 Internal
diversity may also influence a firm‘s stance toward risk-taking, as
Michael Lewis‘s analysis of Icelandic banks and culture,167 and studies
of the influence of gender in the financial services industry,168 suggest.
Enforced self-regulation also stands the best chance of success when
industry actors genuinely care about their broader reputations, something
166. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson & Landon Thomas Jr., Goldman Sachs Rakes In
Profit in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A1.
167. Michael Lewis, Wall Street on the Tundra, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2009, at 140,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/04/iceland200904.
168. LINDA MCDOWELL, CAPITAL CULTURE: GENDER AT WORK IN THE CITY
(1997); Paola Sapienza et al., Gender Differences in Financial Risk Aversion and Career
Choices are Affected by Testosterone, 106 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 15268 (2009),
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/106/36/15268.full.pdf+html?sid= a5f6e12ce595-4b48-b407-c1cbb78db59b.
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that requires commitments and allegiances beyond one‘s own firm and
industry.169
All of this should lead us to wonder whether institutions that draw
on a broader range of perspectives may be better able to maintain some
cognitive distance from group pathologies, to their own advantage and to
the advantage of a new governance regulatory approach. This suggests
that conscious thought needs to be given to how the various pieces of a
new governance regulatory approach will function together—where each
actor‘s strengths and vulnerabilities lie, who is and is not participating in
the interpretive community, and what is required to build checks and
balances into the system‘s functioning.170 The ultimate question has to be
who in that environment seems to have sufficient confidence and
independence of mind (however obtained) to operate independently, how
to maintain that independence, and how to actively keep the process
destabilizing and challenging.
Third, uncertainty may not be the great friend of new governance.
Knightian uncertainty is a serious problem for which new governance
does not necessarily offer a silver bullet, even though it is a promising
response over the long haul. Knightian uncertainty is a breeding ground
for pathologies in decision making and human conduct. It can be, but is
not necessarily, a hoped-for opportunity for out-of-the-box thinking,
surprising collaborations, and unanticipated progress we might hope for.
There may be situations in which the disadvantages of fluid processes (in
terms of increased complexity, decreased transparency and knowability,
and reduced regulatory capacity to provide meaningful oversight) are
very significant. We may want to consider the need for clear,
prophylactic rules around areas where fundamental systemic
requirements are involved and/or regulatory mechanisms can otherwise
become unwieldy—not because rigid, command-and-control style rules
are anything like an ideal solution, but because they may help to at least
temporarily bracket some areas of uncertainty, and allow bounded human
regulators to be more strategic about where new governance methods can
be most effectively implemented. Real life regulatory systems do this all

169. Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of CoRegulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009)
(describing the other prerequisites to effective co-regulation to be the relevance of
flexibility in regulatory detail; the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity and
autonomy on the part of nongovernmental regulators; the degree of transparency in the
regulatory process; and the seriousness of accountability).
170. For an example that assesses American institutions along these lines, see
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002).
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the time, of course, but the time may be ripe for new governance scholars
as well to incorporate attention to real life constraints into their thinking.
None of this is out of line with familiar new governance thought,
but there is a tendency to focus on the success stories as conclusive
evidence that new governance can be very effective. Where experiments
fail, the simple answer is that those implementing it did not do it
correctly. The fact that similar failures occur in a variety of
environments, and that one could even perhaps attribute those failures to
predictable shortcomings, should provoke us to build in safeguards for
those failures—even if we cannot identify safeguards that work ideally
and integrally with new governance at the theoretical level. In this, we
should not allow the perfect (in the form of perfectly free, broadly
participatory, dialogic and reflective problem-solving) to be the enemy of
the good (in the sense of creating systems with as much of these
elements as possible, while remaining clear-eyed about human capacity).
We need to consider the risk that the phenomena described above
will replicate themselves in the interstices of many new governance
processes, including those outside financial regulation. A clear view of
human nature needs to be at the core of the new governance model
because within fluid space, it will drive process and outcomes.
Understanding how people and their institutions operate, individually
and in groups, requires us to build in compensatory responses in
regulatory design in the same way that we would design for other
predictable flaws.

